Over the years, Miranda Warnings have faced a number of challenges in regards to its constitutionality and legality. There have been questions as to whether failure to give Miranda warnings constitute breaking the law or whether they are just measures that aid in delivering justice (Alkhalifa, 2010). With time, investigators have found ways of getting around this requirement. In the Missouri case in 2004 (Missouri vs Selbert), the court put an end to yet another alteration of Miranda practice. Missouri State Police would withhold the warnings deliberately then get a confession from a suspect. They would then go on to inform them of the Miranda Warning, get waivers then get the confessions a second time. This serves as an example on how Miranda has had an effect on the practice of law enforcement. The police now have to proof you understood your actions before a confession can be admissible in court. The prosecution has to proof the suspect knowingly and intelligently waived their rights.
As a presiding judge, I would rule that the confession be admissible in court. The first assumption would be that the detectives read him his Miranda Warning when they arrested him. Even then, when at the back of the officer’s cruiser he already knew he was under arrest. No one was questioning him so the court can only assume he gave up the information under his own volition thereby, waiving his rights (Porto, 2011). In the 1980, case Rhodes vs. Innis of 446 US 291, the court ruled that a spontaneous statement by a suspect in custody even before the Miranda Warnings is read to them is admissible as evidence. The only exception is when the statement is in response to police questioning or other police actions likely to have provoked a response. In this case, the police did not provoke any response and the suspect on his own free will made the statement. Therefore, the statement is admissible as evidence.
The suspect is not guilty due to his mental state at the time he committed the crime. In their testimonies, both the defense and prosecution expert witnesses testified to the fact that John Hinckley Jr. suffered from schizoid personality disorder, narcissism, schizophrenia, dysthymia, major depressive disorder among other mental conditions (Porto, 2011). This shows that both even the prosecution knew that the suspect was not in his right mind when he committed the crime. Therefore, the suspect is not guilty under the insanity reasons.
Under the present 1984 Insanity Defense Reform Act, John Hinckley would be guilty by the jury. This is because in the Hinckley Case, expert witnesses played a major role in proving the suspect was legally insane (Alkhalifa, 2010). In the current law, it would minimize their testimony as to whether the suspect was legally sane.
In the current law, the burden of proof lies with the defense attorney. It would be tough proving the suspect was legally insane given all the preparation and resources he put to accomplish his goal. Additionally, Hinckley’s statement after committing the crime should he had no remorse or regrets for his crimes. This would have worked against him, as it would portray a person who knew what he was doing.
The John Hinckley case played a large role in the writing of the Brady Bill. Though a number of states already had gun control measures, the Brady Bill came up with a number of stricter regulations for gun control.
In conclusion, under this act, gun ownership regulations became tougher and it became harder for people considered a danger in one way or another to own a gun. The former director for Alcohol Tobacco Firearms and Explosives Bureau John Magaw hailed it as a historic and very strong legislation. In Printz vs. US case, Printz unsuccessfully challenged the constitutionality of its interim laws but failed.
References
Porto, B. L. (2011). May it Please the Court: Judicial Processes and Politics in America. New York, NY: Pearson College Division.
Alkhalifa, E. M. (2010). E-strategies for Resource Management Systems: Planning and Implementation. Hershey, PA: IGI Global.